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This study explores the extent to which inequality affects the impact of income growth 
on the rates of poverty changes in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) comparatively with non-
SSA, based on a global sample of 1977–2004 unbalanced panel data. For both regions 
and all three measures of poverty—headcount, gap, and squared gap—the paper finds 
the impact of GDP growth on poverty reduction as a decreasing function of initial 
inequality. The impacts are similar in direction for SSA and non-SSA, so that within 
both regions there are considerable disparities in the responsiveness of poverty to 
income growth, depending on inequality. Nevertheless, the income–growth elasticity is 
substantially less for SSA, implying relatively small poverty-reduction sensitiveness to 
growth compared with the rest of the developing world. Furthermore, the paper finds a 
considerable variation in the predicted values of the income–growth elasticity across a 
large number of SSA countries, implying the need for understanding country-specific 
inequality attributes for effective poverty-reduction strategies. 
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1 Introduction 
Poverty has increasingly become an issue of major global interest, with halving extreme 
poverty by 2015 constituting the first, and perhaps the most critical, goal among the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Since the 1980s, the poverty rate has been 
trending significantly downward in all regions of the world except in sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA), where Goal 1 seems unlikely to be achieved. Indeed, the poverty 
headcount ratio in SSA, measured as the proportion of the population living on less than 
US$1 per day, rose slightly from 45 per cent in 1990 to 46 per cent in 2000 (World 
Bank 2006a), the year of the Millennium Declaration. Over the last quarter century, this 
headcount poverty rate has barely budged in SSA, from its value of 42 per cent in 1981 
to 41 per cent most recently in 2004 (World Bank 2007). Meanwhile, a number of 
studies find that inequality plays an important role in the income–growth–poverty 
relationship (e.g., Adams 2004; Bourguignon 2003; Easterly 2000; Epaulard 2003; Fosu 
2007; Kalwij and Verschoor 2007; Ravallion 1997). Thus, meeting the poverty targets 
of the MDGs, for instance, may require special attention predicated on a better 
understanding of the poverty–growth–inequality relationship, particularly in SSA.  
Growth has traditionally been considered the main engine for poverty reduction. 
However, attention to the importance of income distribution in poverty reduction seems 
to be growing.1 Using evidence for single countries, both Datt and Ravallion (1992) and 
Kakwani (1993) decompose poverty changes into effects attributable to: (1) income 
growth and (2) changes in income distribution. Based on cross-country African data, Ali 
and Thorbecke (2000) find that poverty responds more to income distribution than to 
growth. More recent studies have focused on the role of initial inequality in the impact 
of growth on poverty. For example, Ravallion (1997) and Easterly (2000) estimate the 
income–growth elasticity of poverty as a decreasing function of inequality.2 Similarly, 
using the rather limited sample of 32 paired rural and urban sectors for 16 SSA 
countries employed in Ali and Thorbecke (2000), Fosu (2008) arrives at a similar 
conclusion about the inequality impact on the income elasticity of poverty. Adams 
(2004) also finds that a sub-sample of countries with a higher level of inequality 
exhibits a smaller growth elasticity of poverty. On the assumption of a lognormal 
distribution of income, Bourguignon (2003) and Epaulard (2003) estimate equations 
that assume that the income–growth elasticity, for instance, depends on the ratio of the 
poverty line to mean income as well as on initial inequality. Based on similar 
specifications as in Bourguignon (2003), Kalwij and Verschoor (2007) reach similar 
conclusions as in Bourguignon (2003) and Epaulard (2003), and emphasize regional 
diversity in poverty responsiveness to growth and inequality.  
Complementing the above studies, the current paper provides a focus on SSA,3 where 
poverty reduction is likely to constitute a particularly important challenge as compared 
                                                 
1  For elaboration on the growing importance of income distribution, see for instance, Bruno et al. 
(1998), Chen and Ravallion (1997), and World Bank (2006b). 
2  To simplify the exposition, we shall ignore the negative sign and use ‘income–growth elasticity of 
poverty’ to signify its magnitude. 
3  Except for Ali and Thorbecke (2000) and Fosu (2008), none of the above studies focus on SSA. 
However, the specification used in the former study implicitly assumes that the elasticity of poverty 
with respect to income is independent of the level of inequality. Furthermore, while it estimates the   2
to other regions of the world. The study examines the extent to which inequality 
influences the impact of growth on changes in poverty for SSA relative to other regions, 
exploring the issue of whether SSA fits the global pattern. With historical data showing 
both low growth rates and high levels of inequality in the African region, shedding light 
on this hypothesis should usefully inform policy.  
The current paper deviates from especially the most recent comprehensive study on the 
subject (Kalwij and Verschoor 2007) in several respects. First, it extends the analysis to 
other measures beyond the headcount ratio used in that study, namely, the depth and 
severity of poverty measures. As is well understood in the literature, these two 
additional measures convey more in-depth information about the state of poverty not 
reflected by the headcount ratio alone. Second, the present paper focuses on SSA, rather 
than the implicit interest in particularly Eastern Europe and Central Asia as exhibited by 
the above study. Indeed, such an interest led the authors to employ the US$2-per-day 
measure of poverty rather than the US$1 standard.4 Compared to other regions, 
however, SSA seems to have performed worse over time on the US$1 daily standard 
(see Table 1). For instance, using South Asia (SAS) as the comparator, the US$2 
measure shows only a marginal change in the ratio of SSA to SAS between 1981 and 
2004. In contrast, the US$1 standard reveals a substantial deterioration in the relative 
SSA/SAS poverty rate picture, with this SSA/SAS ratio rising by nearly 50 percentage 
points between 1981 and 2004 when the US$1 measure is employed. This compares 
with a rise of only 10 percentage points, over the same period, on the basis of the US$2 
standard. Thus, if the poverty-reduction challenge for African countries is to be met 
head on, the US$1 measure, an indicator of extreme poverty, appears to warrant special 
consideration, as is done in the present study.  
 
Table 1 
Historical poverty record (headcount ratio in %): SSA versus South Asia (SAS)  
A. US$1 Standard 
  1981 1987 1993 2004 
SSA 42.3 47.2 45.5 41.1 
SAS 49.6 45.1 36.9 30.8 
SSA/SAS 85.3  104.7  123.3  133.4 
     
B. US$2 Standard 
  1981 1987 1993 2004 
SSA 74.5 77.4 76.1 72.0 
SAS 88.5 86.6 82.2 77.1 
SSA/SAS  84.2 89.4 92.6 93.4 
Source: World Bank (2007). 
                                                                                                                                               
interactive inequality–income effect using the rather limited SSA sample of Ali and Thorbecke, the 
latter study employs the headcount ratio only, is based on level data, and provides no comparative 
evidence. 
4  The use of the US$1 standard would have resulted in zero values for a large number of countries in 
the Eastern Europe and Central Asia region, thus excluding them from the study.    3
The paper first presents, in Section 2, a theoretical framework where various hypotheses 
regarding the impacts of growth and inequality are presented. Several specifications are 
estimated in Section 3 for the headcount, gap and squared gap measures of poverty, 
using 1977–2004 unbalanced panel data for SSA relative to the rest of the developing 
world. The implied elasticities are then computed and discussed, focussing on the role 
of inequality in the impact of income growth on changes in poverty. Of particular 
concern here is not only the responsiveness of poverty to income growth for SSA as a 
region relative to the rest of the developing world, but also the variation in this 
responsiveness among African countries. For purposes of poverty reduction, such an 
approach is important for efficient country-specific policymaking in SSA. Section 4 
concludes the paper. 
2 The  model 
To derive the estimating equations,5 we follow the literature and define an individual as 
‘poor’ when his/her income falls short of ‘basic needs’ in a given locality.6 
Furthermore, the lower its value, the more likely that income will be below basic needs, 
so that the level of poverty should decrease with income. Hence, assuming a   
Cobb–Douglas relationship,7 we may specify the poverty function as: 
P = P(Y) = AY
a       (1) 
where P is the level of poverty and Y is income; A reflects initial poverty independently 
of income and is expected to be positive, while a is the income–elasticity of poverty and 
its sign should be negative. A linearized differenced version of Equation (1) is of the 
form: 
p = a1 + a2y     (2) 
where p and y are the respective growth rates of poverty and income; a2 is the elasticity 
of poverty changes with respect to income growth and a1 the growth of poverty at a 
constant level of income.  
Suppose, however, that the socio-political environment, such as the nature of income 
distribution, influences both a1 and a2. For example, a country with a more equally 
distributed income should exhibit a higher rate at which income growth is transformed 
                                                 
5  Although the current derivation is similar to that in Fosu (2008), that study derived and estimated the 
poverty function in (logarithmic) levels rather in growth rates as is done here. 
6  For proponents of the basic-needs approach see, for example, Hicks and Streeten (1979) and Adelman 
(1975); however, Goldstein (1985) and Ram (1985) suggest a ‘trickle-down’ approach to growth. 
Poverty will be measured by the Foster–Greer–Thorbecke (FGT) poverty measures: the headcount 
ratio P0 as the relative frequency below the poverty line; the poverty gap P1 reflecting how far 
incomes are below the line; and the squared gap P2 as a measure of the severity of poverty (see Foster, 
Greer and Thorbecke 1984). 
7  The assumption may be justified by the special properties of the Cobb–Douglas function (CDF) that 
increasing income would reduce poverty at a decreasing rate, since the farther incomes are below the 
poverty line the greater the effort required to raise such incomes above the poverty line. Of course, 
many other functions would satisfy this condition as well; however, the CDF is adopted here to 
simplify the analytical exposition, while the FGT poverty measures will be used in the empirical 
analysis.    4
to poverty reduction, ceteris paribus. Similarly, acceleration in inequality is likely to 
raise the rate at which poverty is increasing. The growth in poverty will, furthermore, be 
faster as initial income is higher, for a larger portion of the non-poverty implied by the 
higher income would be transformed into poverty by the acceleration in inequality. 
Hence a1 and a2 may be expressed parametrically in linear form as:8  
a1 = a11 + a12g + a13Y
I    (3)
 
a2 = a21 + a22G




I are initial levels of income and inequality (Gini), respectively; a11, a12 
and a13 are the parametric coefficients independent of income growth; and a21 and a22 
are the coefficients associated with the income–growth impact. Incorporating Equations 
(3) and (4) into Equation (2) yields: 
p = c1 + c2y + c3g +c4yG
I + c5gY
I     (5) 
where  c1=a11 is the intercept, c2=a21 is the (independent) impact of y on p (when 
g=G
I=0), c3=a12 is the (independent) impact of g (when y=Y
I=0), c4=a22 is the effect of 
y interactively with G
I, and c5=a13 is the effect of g interactively with Y
I.  
The coefficients in Equation (5) are interpreted next. The sign of c2, which is the 
independent impact of y (with G
I=0), is anticipated to be negative, for an increase in 
income growth should reduce the growth of poverty. The sign of c3 is expected to be 
positive, since accelerating inequality would exacerbate poverty increases. As c4 
represents the effect of initial inequality on the impact of y, its sign is anticipated to be 
positive, for a higher level of inequality would lower the poverty-reducing effect of 
growth. The sign of c5 is also expected to be positive, so that, as argued above, at a 
higher initial income acceleration in inequality would map a larger portion of the 
income distribution into poverty increases.  
According to Equation (2), a rise in income growth should reduce poverty 
proportionately. This case is akin to the Dollar and Kraay (2002) proposition that all 
income groups would benefit proportionately from growth increases, thus suggesting no 
special role for income distribution in the poverty–growth relationship. In contrast, 
Equation (5) implies not only that rising inequality has implications for poverty, but also 
that the effect of growth on poverty changes would depend on the level of inequality. 
Equation (5) is similar to the empirical specifications of Ravallion (1997) and Easterly 
(2000), both of whom postulated that inequality would lessen the impact of growth on 
poverty reduction. However, the present equation further incorporates the growth of 
inequality, both as a separate independent variable and interactively with initial income.  
Equation (5) is the main model of interest; however, other specifications are 
additionally estimated. One of these is the constrained version of Equation (5), where 
the interactive effects associated with growth and poverty changes are both assumed to 
be zero. This constrained model is presented as: 
                                                 
8  For an exposition of a variant of the present framework involving the production function, see for 
example Fosu (2001).    5
p = c1 + c2y + c3g     (5′) 
Another alternate model is based on the assumption that the income distribution is 
lognormal, as estimated by Bourguignon (2003), Epaulard (2003), and Kalwij and 
Verschoor (2007), for instance. That model is of the form:9 
p = d1 + d2y + d3g + d4y(Z/Y) + d5yG
I    (6) 
where Z/Y is the ratio of the poverty line Z to income Y; the remaining variables are as 
defined above; and dj (j=1,2,…,5) are the respective coefficients to be estimated. As in 
Equation (5), d2 and d3 are expected to be negative and positive, respectively. However, 
Equation (6) postulates that the income–growth elasticity of poverty depends not only 
on the initial level of inequality, but also on the mean income relative to the poverty 
line. It is anticipated that d4 will be positive, consistent with the hypothesis, based on the 
lognormal income distribution, that a larger income would have associated with it a 
higher (absolute value of) income–growth elasticity. As in Equation (5), d5 is expected 
to be positive as well.  
3  Data, estimation, and results 
3.1 The  data 
The data used in the present analysis are derived from a World Bank global sample, 
which provides 353 usable unbalanced panel observations over 1977–2004, of which 51 
are from SSA and 302 from non-SSA countries.10 There are 24 SSA and 61 non-SSA 
countries in the sample, though country representation differs substantially, depending 
on the availability of survey data. For example, China and India have the greatest 
representation, with 28 and 23 observations, respectively, while the country with the 
largest representation in the SSA sample, Cote d’Ivoire, has only six observations. To 
provide comparability across countries, the same poverty line, US$32.74 per month 
(translating roughly to the international standard of US$1 per day in real 1993 PPP-
adjusted dollars), is applied to all countries and over time. Measures of the headcount 
ratio, p0, poverty gap, p1, and poverty gap squared, p2, are analysed using the above 
equations. 
The Appendix table presents the summary statistics for SSA and non-SSA samples in 
both levels and growth rates. It shows the mean poverty rate (headcount ratio) for SSA 
to be nearly four times that of non-SSA. Similarly, p1 and p2 are more than five and six 
                                                 
9  This model is specified by Bourguignon (2003) as the ‘improved standard model 1’, which 
concentrates on the income–growth elasticity of poverty. Similarly, Epaulard (2003) uses a similar 
specification and finds, based on the US$2 per day poverty standard for a global sample involving 99 
economic episodes from Chen and Ravallion (1997: 20), that ‘the higher the inequality, the lower the 
absolute value of the elasticity; the higher the mean income, the higher the absolute value of the 
elasticity’. Bourguignon (2003) additionally estimates an extended version of this equation: p = d1 + 
d2y + d3g + d4y(Z/Y) + d5yG
I + d6 g(Z/Y) + d7 gG
I , the same version also estimated by Kalwij and 
Verschoor (2007). However, we opt for Equation (6) in order to concentrate on the income–growth 
elasticity, as the last two terms in this equation are on the inequality elasticity. As will be further 
argued later, the extended model yields some counter-intuitive empirical results. 
10  The data source is: http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/jsp/index.jsp   6
times, respectively, larger for SSA, whose mean income is estimated at less than one 
half of that for non-SSA. Meanwhile, the level of inequality, measured by the Gini ratio, 
is only slightly larger for SSA. The growth rates presented in the table are not directly 
comparable across countries or samples, though, as they are calculated for different time 
intervals depending on the availability of survey data. The main rationale for reporting 
them here is to make available all the relevant statistics on which the main results of the 
present paper are based.  
3.2 Estimation  and  results 
Both the fully specified and constrained (c4=c5=0) versions of Equation (5), as well as 
Equation (6), are estimated using random-effects (RE) and country-fixed effects (FE), 
with p0, p1, and p2 as measures of p.11 Based on the Hausman-specification test 
statistics (reported in Table 2), the RE estimates are judged to be statistically superior to 
the FE and are thus reported in Table 2: as specifications (5′), (5) and (6) in Tables 2A, 
2B and 2C, respectively.12 For each model, we provide two sets of coefficients, along 
with their respective t ratios in parentheses. The first set corresponds to non-SSA, and 
the second (righthand side and bolded) to the difference in coefficients, that is, SSA less 
non-SSA.13 This difference-in-coefficients estimation and reporting procedure should 
help delineate the extent to which SSA is different from the global average. For 
example, if a given non-SSA coefficient is positive (negative), while the bolded 
coefficient is negative (positive), then the SSA effect is less than the ‘global’ effect by 
the amount of the bolded value, suggesting a lesser responsiveness of the SSA poverty 
rate to the respective variable. 
We discuss, first, the results from specification (5′) where income growth, y, and 
changes in inequality (Gini), g, enter independently into the poverty equation (see 
Table  2A). As expected, these coefficients are statistically negative and positive, 
respectively, in all equations, implying that a rise in income growth would reduce the 
rate of poverty increases, while acceleration in inequality would exacerbate poverty 
growth. In addition, we note that the bolded coefficients have the opposite signs as the 
main coefficients, and are furthermore statistically significant, suggesting that the 
respective degrees of poverty responsiveness for SSA are lower than for the remaining 
regions. That is, compared to the rest of the developing world, SSA poverty rates would 
exhibit low responsiveness to growth acceleration or to deceleration in inequality. This 
finding appears to hold for all the three poverty measures. 
 
                                                 
11 The RE model is estimated using the Generalized Least Squares (GLS). Note that the results reported 
by Bourguignon (2003) and Epaulard (2003), for instance, are based on Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS). 
12 We fail to reject the null hypothesis that the more efficient RE estimates are also consistent, rendering 
the RE results statistically preferable. However, the FE estimates, which are very similar to those of 
the RE, are shown in the online appendix table 1 in order to lend further credibility to the empirical 
results reported in the paper. 
13 That is, for each coefficient, the SSA coefficient is the non-SSA coefficient plus the bolded 
coefficient.   7
Table 2 
Inequality, growth, and poverty: SSA versus non-SSA 
Regression results (random effects); dependent variables = pj (j=0, 1, and 2) 
Table 2A, specification (5’) 
 p0     p1     p2  
y  -2.870
a  1.750
a   -3.116
a  1.152
a   -3.246
a  1.168
b 
 (-17.67)  (5.26)   (-10.26)  (4.21)   (-8.34)  (2.52) 
g  5.116
a  -3.981
a   5.878
a  -3.758
a   5.968
a  -3.085
a 
 (15.43)  (-7.04)   (8.18)  (-5.02)   (6.53)  (-3.21) 
yG
I  --  --   --  --   --  -- 
             
gY
I  --  --   --  --   --  -- 
             
y(Z/Y)  --  --   --  --   --  -- 
               
Intercept -0.049
c  0.046   -0.069  0.075   -0.086  0.102 
 (-1.66)  (0.61)   (-1.60)  (1.08)   (-1.40)  (1.05) 
Adj. R
2  0.55     0.48     0.33   
SEE  0.49     0.66     0.94   
H  1.41     0.81     3.60   
  [0.84]     [0.94]     [0.46]   
Table 2B, specification (5) 
 p0     p1     p2   
y  -5.976
a  4.034
a   -6.217
a  3.120
c   -5.906
a  1.815 
 (-5.23)  (2.94)   (-5.12)  (1.70)   (-4.19)  (0.75) 
g  2.974
a  -3.066
a   3.501
a  -3.054
c   3.640
b  -2.606 




b   7.092
a  -3.966   6.176
b  -1.810 
 (3.10)  (-1.97)   (2.77)  (-1.05)   (2.01)  (-0.36) 
gY
I  0.016
a  0.006   0.017
b  0.012   0.017  0.015 
 (2.78)  (0.34)   (2.06)  (0.38)   (1.37)  (0.34) 
y(Z/Y)  --  --   --  --   --  -- 
               
Intercept -0.020  0.020   -0.020  0.046   -0.059  0.073 
 (-0.64)  (0.49)   (-0.64)  (0.72)   (-0.96)  (0.80) 
Adj. R
2 0.61     0.52     0.35   
SEE 0.46     0.63     0.92   
H 1.25     3.16     6.0   




   8
Table 2C, specification (5) 
 p0     p1     p2   
y  -8.802
a  5.471
a   -8.233
a  2.887   -7.004
a  -0.388 
 (-4.68)  (2.59)   (-4.23)  (1.13)   (-3.22)  (-0.12) 
g  5.428
a  -4.323
a   6.158
a  -4.080
a   6.190
a  -3.339
a 




b   10.316
a  -3.705   8.219
b  0.969 
 (3.45)  (-2.06)   (2.88)  (-0.86)   (2.03)  (0.18) 
gY
I  --  --   --  --   --  -- 
             
y(Z/Y)  4.083
a  -3.504
b   2.578
c  -1.541   0.992  0.714 
  (2.84)  (-2.32)   (1.81)  (-0.94)   (0.57)  (0.34) 
Intercept -0.025  0.024   -0.049  0.057   -0.07  0.095 
 (-1.85)  (0.52)   (-1.14)  (0.79)   (-1.15)  (0.94) 
Adj. R
2 0.61     0.51     0.34   
SEE 0.46     0.64     0.94   
H 3.91     1.89     4.20   
 [0.79]    [0.97]     [0.76]   
Notes: 
a 0.01 significance (2-tailed);
 b 0.05 significance; 
c 0.10 significance. 
  Estimation was conducted on the whole panel sample (size of 353) using ‘differences-
in-coefficients’. For each set of results, the first column represents non-SSA estimates 
while the next righthand set (bolded) is the set of estimates for the SSA differential 
(that is, SSA less non-SSA), so that the sum of the two estimates for each row 
represents the SSA coefficient estimate for the respective explanatory variable. Under 
the null hypothesis that the coefficient parameter is the same for SSA and non-SSA, 
the right-hand estimates would not be significantly different from zero. H is the 
Hausman test statistic for choice between the Random Effects (RE) and Fixed Effects 
(FE) models, with the respective p-values in square brackets. The figures in 
parentheses are t-ratios based on robust standard errors; Adj. R
2 and SEE are, 
respectively, the coefficient of determination and standard error of estimate. All other 
variables are as defined in the Appendix table. Specifications (5’), (5) and (6) are the 
estimated Equations (5’), (5) and (6) in the text, respectively. 
We now turn to the results, also shown in Table 2 (see Table 2B), from estimating the 
fully specified version of Equation (5), that is, specification (5). It is noteworthy that the 
model provides a better fit generally than specification (5′), on the basis of the SEE and 
adjusted R
2, implying that initial income and inequality do indeed matter. Moreover, as 
expected, the results imply that higher levels of inequality would reduce the income–
growth elasticity of poverty, and that a larger initial income level would exacerbate the 
pernicious effect on poverty associated with inequality increases. With respect to 
the  relative impact on SSA, the results further suggest that the magnitudes of the 
coefficients are generally smaller for SSA. Focussing on the income–growth impact, we 
obtain for the p0 measure an estimate of -6.0 + 7.2G
I for non-SSA, compared with  
-1.9 + 1.8G
I for SSA. The implied elasticity (absolute-valued) estimates that the means 
are 1.1 and 3.0 for SSA and non-SSA, respectively. This differential estimate is similar 
to that obtained under the constrained model, specification (5′) (see Table 2A versus 
Table 2B).  
We consider next in Table 2C the results for Equation (6), which is based on the 
lognormal income distribution; these results are presented as specification (6). The   9
outcome is as anticipated, with higher increases in income and in inequality leading to 
reductions and rises in the rates of poverty changes, respectively. Furthermore, the 
income–growth elasticity decreases with inequality but increases with mean income. On 
the basis of the SEE and adjusted R
2, this model performs better than the ‘naïve’ 
specification (5′), consistent with the finding by Bourguignon (2003), for instance. 
However, it does not outperform specification (5), where the income–growth elasticity 
depends on initial inequality but not necessarily on income. Actually, in cases involving 
p1 and p2, specification (5) appears to perform slightly better than specification (6), in 
terms of goodness of fit, a result that seems consistent with Bourguignon’s finding that 
the lognormal approximation does not fare as well for the higher-order measures of 
poverty.  
Nonetheless, the results for specification (6) are as expected. For example, as in 
specification (5), for p0 the coefficients of y and g are statistically negative and positive, 
respectively, indicating the poverty-reducing effect of income growth and the poverty-
exacerbating impact of increasing inequality. Furthermore, the statistically positive 
coefficient of yG
I implies that a higher initial inequality would reduce the rate at which 
income growth lowers the rate of poverty increases. Finally, the coefficient of y(Z/Y) is 
statistically positive, implying that the poverty-reducing effect of income growth is 
greater as the mean income (relative to the poverty line) is higher. The results for p1 and 
p2 are similar to those of p0; however, the significance of the coefficient of y(Z/Y) 
seems to wane with these higher-order poverty measures. Apparently, the level of 
income is less important for influencing the poverty-reducing effect of income growth 
for poverty depth and severity, rather than for the headcount. This finding contrasts with 
that for inequality, whose interactive effect is significant across all the three poverty 
measures.  
Comparing our results of specification (6) with those of Bourguignon, we observe that 
ours for p0 are strikingly similar to his.14 In contrast, however, the current p1 results, 
which are similar to those of p0, differ considerably from the p1 results reported by 
Bourguignon.15 In particular, Bourguignon’s p1 results show the coefficient of the 
interactive variable (y with the initial Gini) as negative, which suggests rather counter-
intuitively that a higher level of inequality would increase the income–growth elasticity 
of poverty.16 In any case, for the purpose of the present study, and consistent with the 
                                                 
14 Based also on the US$1-per-day standard, Bourguignon (2003, table 1.1, column 3) reports the 
following results based on a sample of 114 growth spells in the 1980s and 1990s as (using the present 
symbols):  
  p0 = 0.0837 – 6.3518y + 5.2863g + 3.9678y(Z/Y) + 7.0039yG
I   R
2 = 0.555  
         (0.0349)   (1.2451)   (0.6529)       (1.1662)         (2.4586) 
  where the figures in parentheses are the respective standard errors. These compare well with our p0 
results reported in Table 2 as (with standard errors in parentheses as well for ease of comparison): 
  p0 = –0.059 – 8.802y + 5.428g + 4.083y(Z/Y) + 11.414G
I    Adj. R
2 =0.61 
          (0.032)    (2.101)   (0.567)      (1.438)         (3.308) 
15 Bourguignon (2003, table 1.2, column 3) reports the following results for p1 (using the present 
symbols; standard errors in parentheses): 
  p1 = 0.1683 – 0.4101y + 7.1231g – 0.9647y(Z/Y) – 2.4774G
I    R
2 = 0.2308 
         (0.0796)  (2.8388)    (1.4885)       (2.6588)        (5.6055) 
16 Indeed, it is likely that these results for p1 in Bourguignon’s table 1.2 are incorrectly reported, since 
they seem to substantially counter his results for p0. As a further indication of possible misreporting, 
it is stated in his table 1.2 that ‘all coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 1 per cent 
probability level except the intercept’; yet as the results duplicated for p1 above show, only the g   10
results of specifications (5′) and (5) discussed above, our estimates from specification 
(6) also suggest lower responsiveness in SSA of poverty to income growth.  
To further elucidate the results, we compute the respective income–growth elasticities 
based on specifications (5′), (5) and (6) as:17 
εy = c2; εg = c3 (with c4=c5=0)     (7) 
εy = c2 + c4G
I; εg = c3 + c5Y
I     (8)
 
εy = d2 + d4(Z/Y) + d5G
I; εg = d3     (9)
 
where all variables and coefficients are as defined in Equations (5) and (6). The results 
are presented in Table 3, which reports the point estimates at the respective means as 
well as the interval (range) estimates for the income–growth elasticity, based on the 
maximum and minimum values of G
I, where applicable. The estimates are presented 
separately for SSA and non-SSA.18 
Table 3 
Partial elasticities of changes in poverty with respect to growths in income and inequality, SSA 
versus non-SSA 
Specification (5’)    Specification (5)  Specification (6) 
SSA countries 
p0      
y  -1.123  -1.154 (-1.434, -0.874)  -1.143 (-1.781, -0.506) 
g  1.136 1.287  1.105 
      
p1      
y  -1.650  -1.697 (-2.194, -1.200)  -1.682 (-2.733, -0.631) 
g  2.121 2.264  2.078 
      
p2      
                                                                                                                                               
coefficient is significantly different from zero. Bourguignon, however, does not report any results for 
p2, so that there is no basis for comparison between his and our estimates. 
17 Note that Bourguignon does not actually present the elasticities derivable from his estimated 
equations. 
18 Also computed were the elasticities based on the extended version of Equation (6): p = d1 + d2y + d3g 
+ d4y(Z/Y) + d5yG
I + d6 g(Z/Y) + d7 gG
I . The estimates of the income–growth elasticities were found to 
be similar to those reported here in Table 3, and are available upon request. However, we prefer to 
report the present estimates mainly because the remaining two terms refer to the effect of changes in 
inequality rather than income growth, and secondarily because we found rather counter-intuitive the 
estimates for the last two terms of the above extended equation. In particular, the negative sign of d6 
suggests that a high level of initial inequality would decrease the rate at which further increases in 
inequality would raise poverty. For the headcount poverty rate, for instance, we estimated for non-
SSA (not presented in Table 2): 
 p 0 = –0.053 – 10.503y + 15.345g + 14.100yG
I + 6.326y(Z/Y) – 17.200gG
I –12.592g(Z/Y) 
          (0.029)     (1.67)       (3.34)        (2.94)            (1.26)             (6.82)       (2.46) 
  which is comparable to the estimated ‘Standard Model 2’ by Bouguignon (2003, table 1.1, column 5) 
of: 
 p 0 = 0.098 – 7.871y + 21.561g + 9.687yG
I + 3.948y(Z/Y) – 20.360gG
I – 16.390g(Z/Y) 
         (0.032) (1.131)     (4.121)      (2.210)        (1.029)           (7.439)           (2.825) 
  where figures in parentheses in both equations are standard errors.   11
y  -2.078  -2.135 (-2.829, -1.441)  -2.120 (-3.581, -0.659) 
g  2.883 3.039  2.851 
      
Non-SSA countries 
p0      
y  -2.870  -2.962 (-4.740, -1.393)  -2.868 (-5.675, -0.391) 
g  5.116 5.557  5.428 
      
p1      
y  -3.166  -3.260 (-5.004, -1.721)  -3.190 (-5.727, -0.951) 
g  5.878 6.254  6.158 
      
p2      
y  -3.246  -3.331 (-4.850, -1.990)  -3.291 (-5.313, -1.508) 
g  5.968 6.384  6.190 
Notes:    Partial elasticities are computed based on Equations (7)–(9) of the text, using the 
respective estimates from Table 2, that is specifications (5), (5’) and (6). The point 
estimates are at the means of the relevant variables, and the interval estimates are 
ranges based on the sample minimum and maximum values of G
I, respectively. All 
variables are as defined in the Appendix table. 
As the results in Table 3 indicate, the elasticity estimates at the means are similar across 
specifications (for both SSA and non-SSA), suggesting that if one is interested in the 
average values only, the simplest specification (5´) will do just as well. Irrespective of 
the specification, however, the results between SSA and non-SSA appear to differ 
considerably, with the SSA elasticities substantially less than those of non-SSA. For 
example, the income–growth elasticity for non-SSA is nearly three times that of SSA, 
so that accelerating growth in SSA would bring forth a much smaller reduction in 
poverty than would be the case in non-SSA. This result is similar to those reported by 
others; for example, Kalwij and Verschoor (2007: 818, table 4) present for the mid-
1990s estimates, based on the US$2 poverty standard, of -0.71 and -1.31 for SSA and 
all regions, respectively. If anything, the present result on the basis of the US$1 measure 
shows an even larger SSA/non-SSA differential.  
Furthermore, the degree of the SSA/non-SSA differences in the income–growth 
elasticities appears to depend on the poverty measure, with the differential for p0 the 
largest (2.6 times), followed by that for p1 (2.0 times), and with the differential for p2 as 
the least (1.6 times). Thus, the overestimation of the growth impact that may result from 
using the global estimate for SSA would appear to be most consequential for p0, which 
is arguably the most popular policy target variable among the various poverty measures. 
Moreover, we observe that the non-SSA/SSA ratios of elasticities are 3.0 and 5.0, 
respectively, for income–growth and changes in inequality (Table 3). This result 
provides support for the notion that in a relative sense growth acceleration, compared 
with reductions in inequality, would be more effective in SSA than in non-SSA, 
notwithstanding the finding that the poverty-reduction efficacy of either inequality or 
income growth would be higher for non-SSA. 
The estimated ranges, also shown in Table 3, indicate that there is a wide disparity in 
income–growth elasticities across countries, thanks to inequality differences, within 
both SSA and elsewhere in the developing world. For example, for non-SSA, Brazil’s   12
income–growth elasticity is estimated at -1.6, compared with China’s of roughly -3.4.19 
The cross-country differences seem less dramatic within SSA, though, where a smaller 
range is estimated (Table 3), due to the lower income–growth elasticities and the 
smaller sample that may have missed extreme values.20 The results suggest that even if 
the estimates are restricted to the current SSA sample, there are large cross-country 
disparities in the income–growth elasticities, with the maximum elasticity being at least 
roughly twice the minimum.21 
Table 4 reports predicted values of the income–growth elasticity for all the 30 SSA 
countries available in the World Bank database based on the most recent data. Note that 
this sample includes as well six additional countries that were excluded from the above 
empirical analysis due to the lack of more than one-period observations required to 
generate growth rates. As the table shows, there is substantial variation in the estimates, 
ranging from 0.63 in Namibia to 1.41 in Ethiopia for p0 under specification (5) where 
initial inequality alone drives the results. A like observation is made under specification 
(6), which takes into account as well the income level relative to the poverty line: from 
0.26 in Namibia to 1.80 in Ethiopia. The results for the other higher-order poverty 
measures are similar to those of p0, though the ranges appear to increase with the order, 
that is, there is a larger range for p1 than for p0, and for p2 than for p1. 
Table 4 
Predicted income–growth elasticity of poverty (in absolute values), SSA countries 
      Specification  (5)  Specification  (6) 
Country    p0 p1 p2  p0 p1 p2 
Benin* BEN  1.263 1.890 2.405 1.465 2.223  2.906 
Botswana BWA  0.870 1.191 1.429 0.725 1.025  1.313 
Burkina Faso  BFA  1.245 1.859 2.362 1.422 2.152  2.806 
Burundi BDI  1.196 1.772 2.240 1.161 1.700  2.109 
Cameroon CMR  1.158 1.704 2.146 1.329 2.014  2.662 
Cape Verde*  CPV  1.053 1.518 1.885 1.221 1.853  2.498 
Central African Republic*  CAF  0.863 1.180 1.413 0.410 0.463 0.394 
Côte d'Ivoire  CIV  1.091 1.584 1.978 1.202 1.807  2.387 
Ethiopia ETH  1.414 2.159 2.781 1.798 2.770  3.661 
Gambia GMB  1.058 1.527 1.898 1.113 1.658  2.172 
Ghana GHA  1.225 1.823 2.312 1.303 1.944  2.484 
Kenya KEN  1.194 1.768 2.235 1.404 2.137  2.830 
Lesotho LSO  0.832 1.124 1.335 0.604 0.820  1.011 
Madagascar MDG  1.107 1.613 2.018 0.967 1.381  1.670 
                                                 
19 These estimates are based on specification (5), with Brazil’s and China’s Gini coefficients in 2004 of 
0.60 and 0.35, respectively, the latest year for which the survey provides data.  
20 Because the SSA sample is much smaller than the global sample, the range is rather limited, especially 
when growth rates, rather than levels of the variables, are used, as in the current study. For example, 
Namibia’s Gini coefficient was 0.74 in 1993, considerably larger than the sample maximum of 0.61; 
however, it is excluded from the present analysis due to the non-availability of other temporal data to 
calculate growth rates.  
21 Based on specification (5), the maximum income–growth elasticity in SSA is about twice the 
minimum, with results for specification (6) exhibiting even larger ranges.   13
Malawi* MWI  1.256 1.877 2.387 1.503 2.293  3.028
Mali MLI  1.238 1.846 2.344 1.268 1.879  2.364
Mauritania MRT  1.255 1.877 2.387 1.453 2.204  2.882
Mozambique MOZ  1.113 1.624 2.034 1.146 1.700  2.188
Namibia* NAM  0.635 0.773 0.846 0.257 0.263  0.284
Niger NER  1.175 1.734 2.187 1.210 1.783  2.231
Nigeria NGA  1.211 1.799 2.278 0.967 1.359  1.569
Rwanda RWA  1.121 1.638 2.053 0.996 1.429  1.735
Senegal SEN  1.216 1.808 2.290 1.429 2.174  2.869
Sierra Leone*  SLE  0.836 1.132 1.346 0.424 0.496  0.475
South Africa  ZAF  0.926 1.291 1.569 0.922 1.360 1.809
Swaziland SWZ  1.051 1.513 1.878 0.962 1.391  1.741
Uganda UGA  1.137 1.666 2.093 0.612 0.737  0.582
Tanzania TZA  1.333 2.015 2.579 1.423 2.125  2.678
Zambia ZMB  1.049 1.511 1.876 0.741 0.995  1.090
Zimbabwe ZWE  1.060 1.530 1.903 1.322 2.033  2.787
Notes:   Countries marked with * were not in the original sample employed for the regression 
estimation due to the inability to generate growth rates from the single-year 
observations for these countries. The most recent data for each country are used for 
the computations reported here; see Table 2 for the formulas underlying the respective 
computations. Note that the differences in the estimates for specification (5) are due to 
(initial) inequality-level differences across countries, while those for specification (6) 
result additionally from income-level differences.  
To provide a better sense of the differences of the income–growth elasticity among SSA 
countries, the estimates in Table 4 may be arranged into quintiles (see Table 2 of the 
online appendix). It is interesting to note that the compositions of the first and last 
quintiles are similar between specifications (5) and (6), suggesting that the level of 
inequality probably dominates the explanation of the categorization into the tails of the 
distribution. That is, a set of policy instruments that succeeds in reducing the level of 
inequality sufficiently could substantially raise the effectiveness of growth in reducing 
poverty. For instance, in the case of countries in the lowest quintile based on 
specification (5) (Botswana, Central African Republic, Lesotho, Namibia, Sierra Leone, 
and South Africa), on the one hand, the results suggest that particular attention should 
be paid to reducing inequality in order to enhance poverty reduction. For the countries 
in the highest quintile (Benin, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Mauritania, Malawi, and 
Tanzania), on the other hand, a greater focus on growth might be advisable.  
An important result for policymaking, then, is that effective poverty reduction in SSA 
would require country-specific approaches based on especially the inequality attributes 
of countries. For example, with an income–growth elasticity of 1.4 associated with p0 
for Ethiopia (Table 4, specification (5)), a 10 per cent rise in the growth rate of income 
should be translated to a reduction in the rate of poverty by 14 per cent. In the other 
extreme, however, similar growth acceleration would be expected to reduce the poverty 
rate by only 6 per cent in Namibia. Furthermore, as this relatively low poverty-reduction 
effectiveness of growth in Namibia is due to the country’s higher level of inequality, the 
policy implication here is that greater attention should be paid to understanding the 
factors responsible for Namibia’s inequality profile.   14
4 Conclusion 
This study has explored the extent to which inequality influences the impact of growth 
on poverty reduction, based on a global sample of 1977–2004 unbalanced panel data for 
SSA and non-SSA countries. Several models are estimated with growths of the 
headcount, gap, and squared gap poverty ratios as respective dependent variables, and 
growths of the Gini and PPP-adjusted incomes as explanatory variables. For both SSA 
and non-SSA samples and for all three poverty measures – headcount, gap, and squared 
gap - the paper finds the impact of GDP growth on poverty reduction as a decreasing 
function of initial inequality. The study additionally observes that higher rates of 
increases in inequality tend to exacerbate poverty, with the magnitude of this effect 
rising with initial income. The income–growth elasticity, moreover, tends to increase 
with mean income relative to the poverty line.   
The above estimated impacts are similar between the SSA and non-SSA samples with 
respect to direction, so that within either sample there are considerable disparities in 
terms of the responsiveness of poverty to changes in growth and inequality. 
Nevertheless, on average, the effects of both income and inequality variables are 
substantially less for SSA. This finding suggests that the marginal benefit in terms of 
poverty reduction in the SSA region would require larger reductions in inequality or 
accelerations in growth than elsewhere in the developing world. 
Furthermore, the findings of the current study suggest that the growth impact is likely to 
differ by country in SSA, depending primarily on the inequality attributes of countries. 
For example, the poverty-reduction efficacy of a given rate of growth acceleration in 
Ethiopia would be more than twice that in Namibia, thanks to the much higher level of 
inequality in the latter country. Similarly, the degree of responsiveness of Botswana’s 
poverty rate is estimated to be only slightly higher than that in Namibia, which might 
explain the minimal rate of poverty reduction in Botswana, with the headcount poverty 
rate for instance falling by only 5 percentage points in a decade, despite the tremendous 
growth in that country.22 In contrast, in Ghana where the income–growth elasticity is 
about twice that of Namibia, the headcount poverty rate for example declined 
substantially, by about 10 percentage points within a decade, in spite of the relatively 
modest growth.23 Thus, understanding the inequality-generating characteristics of 
individual countries could help in designing most effective poverty-reducing strategies 
for this region of the world where the challenge seems so great. 
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Appendix 
Appendix table  
Inequality, growth, and poverty 
Summary statistics, 1977–2004 unbalanced panel data 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) versus non-SSA 
 
Appendix table A. Variables in levels 
Non-SSA versus SSA (in brackets) 
Variable    Mean Std.  Dev. Min  Max 
p0   11.53 [43.17]  13.76  [23.91] 0.08 [3.28] 66.01 [90.26] 
p1   3.35 [18.44]  4.46  [14.25]  0.02  [0.34]  27.24  [52.08] 
p2   1.48 [10.38] 2.21 [9.47] 0.01 [0.06] 13.79 [34.15] 
Y   167.07 [64.86] 92.98 [39.73] 35.24 [19.03] 440.02 [205.98] 
G   0.42 [0.45] 0.11 [0.07] 0.17  [0.30] 0.63 [0.63] 
 
Appendix table B. Growth (log-differenced) rates and other variables 
Non-SSA versus SSA (in brackets) 
Variable    Mean Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
p0    -0.126  [-0.042]  0.782   [0.396]  -3.379   [-0.760]  4.632    [1.480] 
p1    -0.153  [-0.050]  0.949   [0.652]  -3.245   [-1.325]  5.037    [2.255] 
p2    -0.172  [-0.052]  1.194  [0.870]  -3.912   [-1.904]  4.396    [2.803] 
Y    0.042  [0.042]  0.186   [0.243]  -0.655   [-0.860]  0.638    [0.710] 
G   0.008 [0.007]  0.091   [0.154]  -0.320   [-0.294]  0.424    [0.479] 
Y
I   161.408  [62.665] 91.262 [41.580] 25.400 [18.470] 440.020    [224.59]
G
I    0.417  [0.448]  0.104   [0.082]  0.171   [0.289]  0.634    [0.607] 
Z/Y    0.288  [0.677]  0.203   [0.636]  0.074   [0.159]  0.929    [1.720] 
Notes:  
p0 = Headcount ratio (% of population living in households with consumption or income per 
person below the poverty line); p1 = Poverty gap (mean distance below the poverty line as 
% of the poverty line); p2 = Squared poverty gap (mean of squared distances below the 
poverty line as % of the poverty line); Y = Mean monthly per capita income/consumption 
expenditure from survey in 1993 PPP dollars; G = Gini coefficient measuring the level of 
inequality; YI = Initial value of Y; GI = Initial value of the Gini coefficient; Z/Y = Absolute 
poverty line in international PPP-adjusted 1993 dollars (US$32.74) as a proportion of Y; pj = 
Log-difference of Pj (j = 0,1,2); y = Log-difference of Y; g = Log-difference of the Gini 
coefficient.  
The sample comprises the following SSA countries (with usable sample size of 51):  
Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Côte d´Ivoire, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, 
Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, 
Senegal, South Africa, Swaziland, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia, and 
Zimbabwe. 
And the following non-SSA countries (with usable sample size of 302):  
Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, 
Cambodia, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El 
Salvador, Estonia, Georgia, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, 
Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Lao PDR, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, 
Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, 
Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uruguay, 
Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, and Yemen.  
Data source: http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/jsp/index.jsp   17
Online appendix table 1 
Inequality, Growth and Poverty: SSA versus non-SSA 
Regression results (fixed country effects); dependent variables = pj (j=0, 1, and 2) 
Online appendix table 1A, specification (5’) 
 p0     p1     p2  
y  -2.959
a  1.851
a   -3.112
a  1.508
a   -3.023
a  1.047
b 
 (-9.04)  (5.49)   (-8.57)  (3.76)   (-6.82)  (2.03) 
g  5.371
a  -4.323
a   5.695
a  -3.965
a   5.299
a  -3.141
a 
 (6.74)  (-5.29)   (6.33)  (-4.16)   (4.99)  (-2.72) 
yG
I  --  --   --  --   --  -- 
             
gY
I  --  --   --  --   --  -- 
             
y(Z/Y)  --  --   --  --   --  -- 
               
Adj. R
2  0.48     0.42     0.26   
SEE  0.53     0.70     0.99   
Online appendix table 1B, specification (5) 
 
 p0     p1     p2  
y  -5.803
a  3.702
b   -5.723
a  2.066   -5.117
a  0.143 
 (-3.60)  (2.16)   (-3.38)  (1.03)   (-2.92)  (0.06) 
g  3.261
a  -3.099
b   3.330
b  -3.202   2.877  -2.734 
 (3.30)  (-1.96)   (2.28)  (-1.15)   (1.31)  (-0.68) 
yG
I  6.641
b  -4.474   6.082
c  -1.595   4.859  1.703 
 (2.06)  (-1.30)   (1.72)  (-0.38)   (1.24)  (0.33) 
gY
I  0.014
b  0.001   0.016  0.012   0.016  0.018 
 (2.30)  (0.04)   (1.61)  (0.25)   (1.08)  (0.27) 
y(Z/Y)  --  --   --  --   --  -- 
               
Adj. R
2  0.53     0.44     0.26   
SEE  0.51     0.68     0.99   
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Online appendix table 1C, specification (6) 
 p0     p1     p2  
y  -9.596
a  6.839
b   -8.257
a  3.603   -6.183
b  -0.374 
 (-3.33)  (2.24)   (-2.75)  (1.02)   (-2.13)  (-0.10) 
g  5.729
a  -4.639
a   5.958
a  -4.176
a   5.442
a  -3.195
a 




b   10.057
b  -4.495   6.942  1.279 
 (2.48)  (-1.82)   (1.91)  (-0.76)   (1.32)  (0.20) 
gY
I  --  --   --  --   --  -- 
             
y(Z/Y)  5.738
b  -5.254
b   3.438
c  -2.707   0.853  0.320 
  (2.53)  (-2.26)   (1.43)  (-1.05)   (0.33)  (0.11) 
Adj. R
2  0.54     0.44     0.26  
SEE  0.50     0.68     0.99  
Notes: 
a 0.01 significance (2-tailed);
b 0.05 significance; 
c 0.10 significance 
  Estimation was conducted on the whole panel sample (size of 353) using ‘differences-
in-coefficients’. For each set of results, the first column represents non-SSA estimates 
while the next right-hand set (bolded) is the set of estimates for the SSA differential 
(that is, SSA less non-SSA), so that the sum of the two estimates for each row 
represents the SSA coefficient estimate for the respective explanatory variable. Under 
the null hypothesis that the coefficient parameter is the same for SSA and non-SSA, 
the right-hand estimates would not be significantly different from zero. H is the 
Hausman test statistic for choice between the Random Effects (RE) and Fixed Effects 
(FE) models, with the respective p-values in square brackets. The figures in 
parentheses are t-ratios based on robust standard errors; Adj. R
2 and SEE are, 
respectively, the coefficient of determination and standard error of estimate. All other 




Online appendix table 2 
Grouping of SSA countries by quintiles based on predicted income–growth elasticities 
  Specification (5)    Specification (6) 
 p 0 p 1 p 2  P 0 p 1 P 2 
Q1  lowest  20%           
  BWA BWA BWA   BWA CAF  CAF 
  CAF CAF CAF   CAF LSO  LSO 
  LSO LSO LSO   LSO NAM  NAM 
  NAM NAM NAM   NAM SLE  SLE 
  SLE SLE SLE   SLE UGA  UGA 
  ZAF ZAF ZAF   UGA  ZMB  ZMB 
Q2 20 – 40%               
  CIV CIV CIV   MDG  BWA  BWA 
 CPV  CPV  CPV    NER  MDG  MDG 
  GMB GMB GMB   RWA NER  NER 
  SWZ SWZ SWZ   SWZ RWA  RWA 
  ZMB ZMB ZMB   ZAF  SWZ  SWZ   19
  ZWE ZWE ZWE   ZMB ZAF  ZAF 
Q3 40 – 60%           
  CMR CMR CMR   BDI  BDI  BDI 
 MDG  MDG  MDG    CIV  CIV  CIV 
  MOZ MOZ MOZ   CPV CPV  GMB 
  NER NER NER   GMB GMB  MLI 
 RWA  RWA  RWA    MOZ  MOZ  MOZ 
  UGA UGA UGA   NGA NGA  NGA 
Q4: 60 – 80%               
  BDI BDI BDI   BFA  CMR  BFA 
 GHA  GHA  GHA    CMR  GHA  CMR 
 KEN  KEN  KEN    GHA  KEN  CPV 
  MLI MLI MLI   KEN  MLI  GHA 
 NGA  NGA  NGA    MLI  TZA  TZA 
 SEN  SEN  SEN    ZWE  ZWE  ZWE 
Q5: highest 20%           
  BEN BEN BEN   BEN BEN  BEN 
 BFA  BFA  BFA    ETH  BFA  ETH 
  ETH ETH ETH   MRT ETH  KEN 
 MRT  MRT  MRT    MWI  MRT  MRT 
  MWI MWI MWI   SEN MWI  MWI 
  TZA TZA TZA   TZA SEN  SEN 
 
Notes:   The categorization is based on the estimates provided in Table 4 of the text, which also 
contains definitions of the country acronyms. Country acronyms in each quintile are 
presented in alphabetical order. 
 